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Abstract 
Frontier markets constitute a category of markets for which very little is known 
regarding the behaviour of their institutional investors. This study attempts to shed 
light on this issue by investigating whether fund managers herd in frontier markets 
and whether their herding is intentional or not using data on quarterly portfolio 
holdings of funds from two such markets (Bulgaria and Montenegro). Results show 
that fund managers herd significantly in both markets; controlling for the interaction 
of their herding with different market states, we find that herding is stronger for both 
markets during periods of positive market performance and high volume, while in the 
case of Montenegro it also appears significant during periods of low volatility. Our 
findings are consistent with fund managers herding intentionally, in anticipation of 
informational and/or professional payoffs. We also find that Bulgarian (Montenegrin) 
fund managers herd significantly after (before) the outbreak of the 2008 global 
financial crisis and we attribute this to a volume-effect, since Montenegro (Bulgaria) 
saw the heaviest trading activity before (after) the crisis’ outbreak.  
Keywords: herding; mutual funds; frontier markets; intent 
JEL Classification: G02; G10; G15; G23 
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1. Introduction 
Institutional herding has been at the focus of much research conducted in 
behavioural finance during the past couple of decades with extensive evidence from 
a series of markets confirming that fund managers herd significantly in their trades 
internationally. The propensity of fund managers towards imitating each other has 
been rationalized through several theoretical designs over time. Less skilled fund 
managers in the acquisition/processing of information, for example, may choose to 
copy the trades of their better-informed peers in order to extract informational payoffs 
(Devenow and Welch, 1996). Less able/reputed fund managers may also imitate the 
trades of their better-able peers with the purpose of improving on their image and 
protecting their career prospects (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Relative 
homogeneity among fund managers (in terms of their educational background and 
professional framework) can also lead them to produce correlated trades (De Bondt 
and Teh, 1997), while a similar argument has been advanced for characteristic 
trading, given the tendency of fund managers to follow various styles (e.g. 
momentum/contrarian, value/growth etc) in their investments (Bennett et al., 2003).      
Empirical evidence from a wide cross-section of long-established capital markets, 
both developed as well as emerging, has identified the sources of herding with both 
intentional (e.g. fund managers aiming at extracting informational payoffs or 
improving their professional image) as well as unintentional (e.g. characteristic 
trading) reasons. It is, however, interesting to note the absence of research on 
whether – and why – fund managers herd in the specific segment of markets known 
as frontier markets. The term “frontier markets” has been used to describe those 
emerging markets whose financial systems in general and stock exchanges in 
particular exhibit a lesser degree of development compared to traditional, long-
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standing emerging markets (De Groot et al., 2012). Such environments are normally 
typified by inexperienced market participants, low overall trading activity and 
incomplete institutional frameworks with weaknesses in the presence and 
enforceability of disclosure rules. Adding to the above the fact that the infancy stage 
of their financial development precludes the possibility of their institutional 
investment section being developed suggests that fund managers in frontier markets 
lack the investment experience of their counterparts in developed markets while at 
the same time having to operate in environments of high risk and questionable 
informational quality. The presence of such conditions increases the likelihood that 
institutional herding in frontier markets will not only be significant but also intentional 
and it is this issue that we seek to address in our study.         
To examine whether fund managers herd in frontier markets and whether they do so 
intentionally or not, we use two unique data sets of institutional holdings involving 
quarterly portfolio statements of funds from Bulgaria and Montenegro for the January 
2005 – December 2012 period. Our results denote that institutional herding in both 
markets is significant, while after partitioning our data on the basis of various market 
states (market returns; market volatility; market volume) we find that it is intentional, 
driven by informational and career considerations. We also find that Bulgarian 
(Montenegrin) fund managers herd significantly after (before) the outbreak of the 
2008 global crisis and we attribute this to a volume-effect, since Montenegro 
(Bulgaria) saw the heaviest trading activity before (after) the crisis’ outbreak. 
Our research produces important contributions to the extant literature on herd 
behaviour. First, our study contributes to our understanding of institutional herding by 
providing evidence on the propensity of fund managers to herd in frontier markets for 
the first time in the literature. Key to this contribution is the fact that, unlike their 
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developed and emerging counterparts, frontier markets are very small in terms of the 
size of both their fund-industry and their capitalization/volume; this allows us the 
opportunity to test for institutional herding under very concentrated market 
conditions, entailing features (e.g. a small number of fund managers facilitates peer-
observation) capable of inducing imitation among institutional investors. Secondly, 
our findings confirm that, although fund managers in frontier markets can herd 
equally intentionally as their peers in more developed markets (Holmes et al., 2013; 
Gavriilidis et al., 2013), their herding is significantly influenced by their markets’ 
volume. Considering the relative illiquidity of frontier markets, this indicates that the 
decision of their fund managers to herd is heavily reliant on the prevailing trading 
activity, since high volume renders their herding feasible by reducing trading 
frictions, thus allowing “good” fund managers to trade on their information and “bad” 
fund managers to copy them.  
In view of the growing interest on behalf of the global investment community in 
frontier markets1, the findings presented in our study are of particular interest to 
investors, as they can be used as input to inform their strategies in these markets, 
more so in view of recent evidence (Goetzmann et al., 2005; Speidell and Krohne, 
2007; Berger et al., 2011) regarding the diversification benefits conferred by 
investing in frontier markets. From the perspective of frontier markets’ regulators our 
results should be of concern, since the presence of intentional institutional herding 
can lead funds to choose sub-optimal portfolio allocations; what is more, given the 
leverage funds command in these markets and the latter’s overall low trading 
activity, their herding can also be potentially destabilizing, thus accentuating the 
need for regulatory measures aiming at reducing the herding tendencies of funds in 
these markets.    
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the key motivations 
(intentional and unintentional) underlying the decision of fund managers to herd. 
Section 3 introduces the data sets and the empirical framework employed; section 4 
outlines and discusses the empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Herding and its Motivations 
Herding as a practice constitutes a “passive” (in the sense that funds engaging in 
herding end up copying their peers) management strategy, leading to portfolio-
allocations that may be neither optimal, nor in line with investors’ risk-preferences, 
compared for example to an active management strategy. The prevalence of herd 
behaviour among fund managers is considered undesirable from a regulatory 
viewpoint too, since institutional investors’ dominance in equity trading internationally 
implies that any herding on their behalf can destabilize prices and render markets 
riskier (Goodhart et al., 1999). A key issue arising is why market participants as 
sophisticated as fund managers would choose to resort to peer-mimicking in their 
trades instead of relying on their private signals. A series of studies (Bikhchandani 
and Sharma, 2001; Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis et al., 2013) argued that the 
choice to herd can be either motivated by intent or be the product of an 
environmental state commonly affecting all investors that prompts similar reactions 
on their behalf (“spurious” herding).  
To begin with, herding is intentional when the choice to herd is motivated by the 
anticipation of a positive externality (a benefit) and usually presupposes a relative 
view of one’s position vis-à-vis others. A fund manager, for example, may consider 
his information to be of low quality or his information-processing abilities to be 
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inadequate compared to his peers’; in other words he may perceive himself to be in 
an asymmetric situation relative to other fund managers. It would, therefore be 
rational for him to copy his peers’ trades, in order to free-ride on their informational 
superiority and extract informational payoffs (Devenow and Welch, 1996). If fund 
managers end up discarding their private signals in favour of their peers’ actions, this 
will slow down the signal-flow to the market (information blockage), render the public 
pool of information poorer and lead to the evolution of informational cascades 
(Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). A second possibility is that the benefits 
anticipated by fund managers when choosing to mimic their peers intentionally are 
linked to professional payoffs. The issue here relates to the relative performance 
assessment investment professionals are subject to periodically (e.g. every quarter). 
A “bad” manager (one e.g. of low ability) has every incentive to copy his “good” 
peers in order to conceal his true quality and improve his professional image (i.e. 
appear “good” too). If this happens, the assessment process within asset 
management companies faces a jamming, since it grows impossible to determine 
whether a manager performs well as a result of his high ability or his peer-mimicking 
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Ability aside, reputation can also be a factor here, with 
less reputed finance professionals being more susceptible towards following the 
actions of the well-reputed ones (Trueman, 1994; Clement and Tse, 2005).  
However, it is possible that institutional herding is unintentional, due to the 
presence of factors in the funds’ industry common to all managers leading them to 
exhibit convergence in their trades. It is possible, for example, that fund managers 
behave similarly due to the innate relative homogeneity (De Bondt and Teh, 1997; 
Wermers, 1999) in their ranks. The idea here is that investment professionals bear 
certain common traits in terms of their educational background, their investment 
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experience, the signals received (they have to analyze the same/similar indicators) 
and their interpretation, as well as the regulatory framework2 they are subject to. It is 
also possible that herding is unintentional due to the common – among fund 
managers – practice of style investing (e.g. Bennett et al., 2003). If several funds 
pursue contrarian strategies, for example, one would expect correlation in their 
trades (they would herd into recent losers and out of recent winners) as a result of 
the same style followed, without this being due to intent.  
In view of the above motives underlying institutional herding, the possibility of fund 
managers imitating each other in their trades has been extensively researched 
during the past two decades with evidence from a large array of long-established 
developed and emerging markets - including the US (Li and Yung, 2004; Sias, 2004; 
Choi and Sias, 2009; Liao et al., 2011), Germany (Walter and Weber, 2006; Kremer 
and Nautz, 2013), South Korea (Choe et al., 1999; Kim and Wei, 2002a; 2002b) and 
Taiwan (Hung et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2012) - suggesting that investment 
professionals exhibit significant mimicry in their trading behaviour. However, no 
evidence has as yet been reported regarding institutional herding for the specific 
subset of markets known as frontier markets, despite the increased attention they 
have been receiving recently from professional investors (De Groot et al., 2012). To 
begin with, frontier economies are free-market in their orientation, undergoing their 
initial steps in terms of economic development (Umland, 2008), as opposed to other 
long-established emerging markets. The high growth rates frontier markets tend to 
exhibit coupled with their young and fast-growing populations suggest a sustainable 
growth potential for these economies for the future (Behar and Hest, 2010). Given 
the infancy stage of their financial systems, their regulatory frameworks are expected 
to be incomplete, with challenges possibly arising in the implementation of their rules 
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(2010 Meketa Investment Group white paper on frontier markets, p. 6). In such 
environments, corporate disclosure is likely to be less credible and transparency is 
expected to be low, leading investors to place less faith in public information and - 
given their relatively limited investment experience – grow more susceptible to non-
fundamental trading patterns (such as herding). Stock exchanges in frontier markets 
tend to enjoy overall low trading activity, while the low per capita income in most of 
these markets further contributes to their illiquidity as it fails to allow for wide 
participation on behalf of their local investors (Kallinterakis et al., 2010). Despite their 
market-orientation, the presence of restrictions over the entry and trading conduct of 
foreign investors (Behar and Hest, 2010) is a likely occurrence in frontier markets, 
further curtailing investors’ participation there. Equity listings in frontier markets often 
involve rather high numbers of stocks, most of which are expected to suffer from thin 
trading3, in view of the aforementioned low volumes characterizing these markets.  
Funds operating in such environments can consider herding a viable strategy for 
several reasons. The very fact that public information is of uncertain quality 
constitutes a good first motive for a manager to observe (and copy) the trades of his 
peers for the purpose of extracting informational payoffs. This is a strong possibility 
in frontier markets, since fund managers there would be expected to be less 
experienced compared to their counterparts in developed markets and would thus be 
more inclined towards imitating their peers as opposed to relying on their own private 
signals. What is more, the fact that fund industries in frontier markets are relatively 
underdeveloped compared to their more advanced peers implies that the number of 
funds in these markets is bound to be small, thus facilitating observation in the first 
place and rendering it more likely that fund managers know each other. Under such 
conditions, “bad” managers are aware of who is “good” in their industry which makes 
9 
 
it easier to know whom to follow; this is an important issue here, since any 
underperformance in a small professional community is likely to confer a more 
personalized stigma over its bearer (Do et al., 2008).       
Consequently, the discussion has so far indicated that the specific conditions in 
frontier markets encourage intentional herding among institutional investors in 
anticipation of both informational as well as professional payoffs; however, no 
evidence on the issue of herding significance and intent has been produced to date 
for these markets. Our study contributes to the extant literature by investigating 
institutional herding in two frontier markets (Bulgaria and Montenegro) and produces 
results indicating that fund managers not only herd significantly in these markets, but 
also that their herding is due to intent. The next section presents the data used in 
this paper, followed by the empirical design employed to assess the significance and 
intent of herding.  
 
3.  Data - Methodology 
3. 1  Data  
Our study is based on two unique data sets involving quarter-end reports of domestic 
equity fund-holdings from two markets, Bulgaria and Montenegro, for the January 
2005 – December 2012 period. Data on Bulgarian fund-holdings were obtained from 
Bulgaria’s Financial Supervision Commission and include a total of 25 funds; data on 
Montenegrin fund-holdings were obtained both from the Montenegro Stock 
Exchange and individual funds and include a total of 6 funds. The data in both 
countries’ reports contains information on the name of each stock held, its ISIN code, 
the number of shares of each stock held by the fund at the end of each quarter and 
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the value (in Bulgarian Leva for Bulgarian funds; in Euros for Montenegrin funds) of 
the fund’s position in each stock at the end of each quarter. We excluded from our 
sample those funds whose reports were filed at the semi-annual frequency as well 
as funds whose reports were not available for each consecutive quarter for our 
sample period.  
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics regarding our two data sets. According 
to panel A, the 25 Bulgarian funds of our sample invested at any point during our 
sample period in 143 stocks of their home-market; the equivalent figure for the 6 
Montenegrin funds of our sample is 82. Although funds in each market appear to 
invest in a rather wide selection of stocks, the overall picture does not indicate 
considerable trading activity. In the case of Bulgaria, the average number of stocks 
held by at least one fund per quarter is 86.2 (panel B), whereas the average number 
of stocks actively traded by at least one fund per quarter is 59.7 (panel C). Similarly 
for Montenegro, the average number of stocks held by at least one fund per quarter 
is 58.9 (panel B) and the average number of stocks actively traded by at least one 
fund per quarter is 25.8 (panel C). In other words, it seems that, on average, about a 
third of the stocks held by Bulgarian funds and just over half of the stocks held by 
Montenegrin funds each quarter are not traded at all. What is more, institutional 
participation per stock per quarter is notably thin. In the case of Bulgaria, the 
average number of holding funds per stock per quarter equals 3.8 (panel D), 
whereas the average number of active funds per stock per quarter is 3.0 (panel E). 
As far as Montenegro is concerned, the average number of holding funds per stock 
per quarter equals 2.3 (panel D), whereas the average number of active funds per 
stock per quarter is 1.5 (panel E). Therefore, the overall picture from our sample 
markets is one where trading activity is undertaken each quarter on average for a 
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fraction of the stocks held and by a very small number (two to three) of funds per 
stock. The small size of both markets’ fund industries increases the probability that 
fund managers there know each other, while the very fact that each fund manager 
has, on average, one or two of his peers to monitor for each stock he invests in, 
facilitates peer-observation, thus rendering these markets very appealing in terms of 
both studying herding and establishing intent behind it. 
Panels F and G present a series of descriptive statistics (mean; median; standard 
deviation; quartiles’ distribution) for the full sample period (panel F) and each year 
(panel G) of the market returns/volatility/volume for Bulgaria and Montenegro, based 
on the BG40 and NEX20 indices respectively. On balance, the average return for 
Montenegro is positive for the full sample period (around 4.6 percent; see panel F), 
mainly driven by the strong performance of the NEX20 index during the 2005-2007 
period (cumulative return equal to almost 75 percent) as the figures in panel G 
indicate. Conversely, the average return of the BG40 for the full sample period is -
0.19 percent (see panel F), something largely attributed to the fact that the BG40’s 
performance during the bullish period of 2005-2007 (cumulative return equal to 
almost 37 percent) was less strongly positive compared to Montenegro’s. As regards 
volatility, its mean value appears always larger for Montenegro, something further 
confirmed when examining its median value, both for the full sample period and 
year-on-year. Looking at the volume figures, we notice that trading activity exhibits 
an overall rising trend in Bulgaria, as its average annual value rises steadily between 
2005-2007, decreases significantly during 2008-2009 and increases again 
afterwards; conversely, average volume in Montenegro peaks in 2007 and dwindles 
to low levels afterwards. Overall, the highest average volume values in Montenegro 
are observed during the 2005-2007 period and 2009, with the highest average 
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volume values in Bulgaria observed during the 2007-2009 period and 2012. 
Combining the above with the fact that the average volume in Montenegro was 
larger than Bulgaria’s during the 2005-2007 period (with the picture reversing itself 
afterwards), one can notice that the heaviest trading activity in Bulgaria 
(Montenegro) was observed after (before) the outbreak of the 2008 global financial 
crisis.  
 
3. 2  Methodology  
The seminal measure used in the literature to identify herding among fund managers 
was the one proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992), according to which, herding is 
calculated based on the fraction of funds buying stock i in a given period t as follows: 
Hi,t = [|Bi,t/(Bi,t + Si,t) – pt|] – AFi,t                                                                                 (1) 
In the above equation, Bi,t (Si,t) represents the fraction of funds increasing 
(decreasing) their positions in stock i (effectively, the proportion of buyers and 
sellers, respectively) during period t. pt is calculated as the number of “buyers” 
relative to the total number of active funds in the market across all stocks within 
period t, the term “active” here referring only to those funds which have changed 
their position in stock i within the period. Essentially, pt is calculated by averaging 
Bi,t/(Bi,t + Si,t) across all stocks within a period, reflecting the average institutional 
demand for stocks within that period, or equivalently the expected proportion of 
buyers for that period (Wermers, 1999). If funds trade independently from each other 
(i.e. there is no herding), Bi,t/(Bi,t + Si,t) = pt for any stock i during period t. To account 
for the random variations of Bi,t/(Bi,t + Si,t) around pt, Lakonishok et al. (1992) employ 
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an adjustment factor (AFi,t) which is equal to the expected value of  |Bi,t/(Bi,t + Si,t) - pt| 
under the assumption that Bi,t follows a binomial distribution with probability of 
“success” p = pt. The presence of herding in this case is asserted via the deviations 
of |Bi,t/(Bi,t + Si,t) - pt| from its expected value (reflected through the AFi,t). The 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) measure has been widely utilized in several herding studies, 
yet has been found to suffer from drawbacks rendering it less appropriate for the 
context of our study. First of all, it implicitly assumes that short-selling is possible; 
however, the rudimentary institutional design and relatively low trading volume 
typifying frontier markets would suggest that short-selling is an activity either not 
allowed or not feasible in these markets. If short-selling is not allowed/feasible, then 
the buy-side in the Lakonishok et al. (1992) measure will appear stronger (the 
number of funds selling a stock at the end of each period will never be more than the 
number of funds holding the stock at the beginning of the period), leading to 
distortions in the binomial distribution of Bi,t and, ultimately, upward biases in Bi,t – 
and herding (for a concise discussion of this, see Wylie, 2005). Secondly, their 
measure assumes that the ex-ante probability of a fund manager buying a stock 
depends exclusively on the degree of herding (Wylie, 2005); in reality, the low 
trading volume of frontier markets may pose far greater a concern to the buy-
decisions of their fund managers, since illiquidity can introduce frictions in the trading 
process by delaying the execution of a buy-order, irrespective of whether the order 
was motivated by herding or not. Thirdly, the measure captures the tendency of fund 
managers to trade in a given direction over and above what would be expected from 
them if their trades were random and independent, without accounting for the fact 
that this correlation in institutional demand may be due to herding as much as habit-
investing (the case of funds following their own trades from previous periods). 
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However, disentangling between funds following each other versus funds following 
their past trades merits an intertemporal examination of institutional demand, 
something not possible in the Lakonishok et al. (1992) measure, since it identifies 
herding within – rather than across – periods.  
The above prompted us to empirically identify herding in this study by employing the 
design proposed by Sias (2004) – rather than the Lakonishok et al. (1992) one - 
which aims at extracting herding through the temporal dependence of institutional 
demand and which, in line with the scope of this study, has been used in research 
(Holmes et al., 2013; Gavriilidis et al., 2013) for the purpose of examining whether 
institutional herding is intentional or not. In this model’s context, institutional demand 
is defined as the raw fraction of funds buying security k in period t and is denoted by 
    k,t , as follows: 
    k,t = 
                                                 
                                                          
                                        (2)  
If a fund increases its position in security k in period t compared to period t-1, it is 
identified as a “buyer”; conversely, if it decreases its position in security k in period t 
compared to period t-1, it is identified as a “seller”. The next step is to standardize 
    k,t by subtracting in each period from each security’s     k,t its cross-sectional 
(across all active stocks in that period) average and divide it by its cross-sectional 
standard deviation: 
 
      
                       
          
                                                                                                   (3) 
15 
 
Sias (2004) assumes that      follows an autoregressive process of order one in 
order to gauge the temporal dependence in the structure of institutional demand; 
more specifically: 
                                                                                                         (4) 
Equation (4) has both its sides standardized and since it bears only one explanatory 
variable (      ), its slope (  ) constitutes the cross-sectional correlation between 
institutional demand in periods t and t-1, respectively. Sias (2004) showed that the 
slope-coefficient can be broken into two components, the former being due to funds 
following their own past trades and the latter being due to funds following the trades 
of their peers (herding): 
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Nk,t is the total number of funds which are active in stock k in period t, Dn,k,t is a 
dummy variable whose value equals one (zero) if fund n is a buyer (seller) of stock k 
in period t, Raw∆k,t is the raw fraction of funds buying stock k in period t,  (Raw∆k,t) 
is the cross sectional standard deviation of Raw∆k,t across all active securities in 
period t and tRaw  is the cross-sectional average of Raw∆k,t in period t. The first 
additive component of equation (5) represents that part of    due to funds following 
their own past trades; a positive value of this component would suggest that funds in 
period t trade in the direction of their trades in the previous period, while a negative 
value would suggest that funds in period t trade in a direction opposite to that of their 
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trades in period t-1. The second additive component of equation (5) reflects that part 
of    due to funds following other funds (herding); a positive (negative) value for this 
component indicates that funds in period t follow (trade against) other funds’ trades 
of period t-1. 
Having established with equations (4) and (5) whether institutional herding is 
significant or not in our sample markets, the next step is to assess whether it is 
motivated by intent or not. To that end, we condition it upon a variety of factors 
reflective of market conditions (market returns; market volatility; market volume) 
whose relationship to herding intent is described below.  
- Market returns: if the market exhibits negative performance, the likelihood of fund 
managers making a loss increases, thus leading them to face issues in their 
performance evaluation. As a result, during periods of market slumps, “bad” 
managers bear an enhanced incentive to mimic their “good” peers in order to “share 
the blame”. More specifically, in a down-market, where most (if not, all) managers 
have performed badly, it is preferable for a “bad” manager’s trades to appear similar 
to those of his “good” peers, as he can then claim he did no worse than them and 
attribute his performance to adverse market conditions. However, “bad” managers 
would also prefer to mimic their “good” peers during bullish markets, since 
underperforming during good times would only help confirm their poor ability. 
Consequently, if herding is intentional (i.e. driven by informational and professional 
reasons), a relationship between herding and the market’s return (which would 
translate into differences in herding between periods of positive and periods of 
negative market returns) would be expected to arise, although the direction of this 
relationship is ambiguous. Conversely, if herding is spurious (due, e.g. to relative 
homogeneity or characteristic trading), we would not expect to witness any such 
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differences arising in herding significance. If herding is driven by relative 
homogeneity and changes in the market’s return quarter-to-quarter (given the 
quarterly frequency of our data) have an impact over herding, this would imply that 
the population composition of fund managers exhibits significant variability between 
successive quarters, something highly unlikely. If herding is driven by characteristic 
trading, then as Holmes et al. (2013) argued, it is likely that the market performance 
can affect the profitability of investment styles, yet not the propensity of people to 
engage in those (i.e. their level).  
To proxy for market returns in our sample markets, we use the quarter-end closing 
prices of the BG40 (for Bulgaria) and NEX20 (for Montenegro) indices, calculate their 
quarterly log-differenced returns and, for each index, rank those returns in ascending 
order. Using the series from equation (4) and its two components (“funds 
following their own trades”; “funds following the trades of other funds”) from equation 
(5) for each market, we partition  and its two components into two parts contingent 
upon whether the market return of the quarter is positive or negative, respectively.  
- Market volatility: if volatility in a market is high, the public pool of information 
becomes more difficult to process and “bad” managers (with below-average 
processing skills) may, thus be prompted to copy their “good” peers in order to 
reduce the perceived complexity of the informational environment (and improve their 
professional image). If volatility in a market is low, this can also encourage “bad” 
managers to mimic their “good” peers, since it makes it easier for “bad” managers to 
identify the behaviour of their “good” counterparts (Holmes et al., 2013). 
Consequently, if herding is due to intent, we would anticipate a relationship to exist 
between herding and market volatility (we would expect herding to exhibit differences 
between periods of high and periods of low volatility), though again here it is not 
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possible to assert the sign of this relationship. Conversely, if herding is spurious 
(due, e.g. to relative homogeneity or characteristic trading), we would not expect to 
witness any such differences arising in herding significance; this is because neither 
relative homogeneity among fund managers, nor the level of style investing would be 
expected to vary with market volatility.  
We calculate market volatility for each of the two markets for each quarter using the 
daily closing prices of the BG40 (for Bulgaria) and NEX20 (for Montenegro) indices 
based on the approach proposed by Schwert (1989); following that, we rank the 
quarterly volatility figures in ascending order, split them into a high-volatility half and 
a low-volatility half and then partition  and its two components accordingly.  
- Market volume: trading volume is considered to be an effective information flow 
proxy (Jiang and Kryzanowski, 1998), since high trading activity in a market 
encourages the participation of informed traders (it allows them to trade more easily 
on their information by reducing frictions in the trading process; Romano, 2007). If 
so, then the visibility of “good” fund managers (key candidates for informed traders) 
in the market should increase during periods with high volume, thus rendering it 
easier for “bad” managers to mimic them. However, it is possible that periods with 
low trading activity are also conducive to institutional herding. Fund managers can 
experience problems in seeing their orders being executed during low-volume 
periods, thus being faced with increased liquidity risk and performance-related 
issues. The latter here arise when a fund manager wishes to rid his portfolio off 
certain stocks (e.g. recent losers) and cannot sell them due to the low volume in the 
market hindering transactions. Under such conditions, investing into (or out of) the 
same stocks as their peers is a rational option; because stocks that other funds will 
be flocking towards will enjoy higher liquidity, this guarantees that any order placed 
19 
 
for these stocks will be executed with higher probability. If herding is intentional, we 
would therefore expect a relationship between herding and market volume to unfold 
(herding would exhibit differences between periods of high and periods of low 
volume), yet as indicated above, its direction would be hard to assert. Conversely, if 
herding is unintentional, such a relationship would not be expected to arise, because 
variations in market volume between quarters would not be expected to affect either 
the relative homogeneity among fund managers, or the level of their characteristic 
trading. To control for the impact of market volume over herding, we use the daily 
volume (in shares) observations of the BG40 (for Bulgaria) and NEX20 (for 
Montenegro) indices, aggregate them for each index in each quarter, rank the 
quarterly volume figures of each market in ascending order, split them into a high-
volume half and a low-volume half and then partition  and its two components 
accordingly. 
All data on the daily/quarter-end closing prices and daily volumes of the BG40 and 
NEX20 indices were obtained from the websites of the Bulgarian and Montenegrin 
stock exchanges, respectively. Controlling for the impact of market returns, market 
volatility and market volume over institutional herding concludes our empirical 
investigation of intent among fund managers in Bulgaria and Montenegro. However, 
since our sample window includes the outbreak of the 2008 global credit crisis, we 
consider it appropriate to assess its impact over institutional herding in our sample 
markets, more so given research evidence stipulating that financial crises are turning 
points in herding-evolution (Hwang and Salmon, 2004). To that end, we split our 
sample period into a pre-crisis (January 2005 – December 2007) and a crisis (March 
2008 – December 2012) sub-period and then partition  and its two components in 
line with this split.  
20 
 
4. Results – Discussion 
We begin by presenting the results from equations (4) and (5), i.e. the estimates of 
   and its two components, “funds following their own trades” and “funds following 
the trades of other funds” for the Bulgarian and Montenegrin markets. We present 
results for stocks for which there was one or more funds trading (panel A in tables 2-
6) and for which there were two or more funds trading (panel B in tables 2-6). The 
two thresholds employed here are in line with what we discussed earlier regarding 
the low (two to three) average number of active funds per stock in the two markets 
and are used here to gauge the robustness of our results. For the purpose of our 
discussion, any reference of statistical significance will pertain to estimates 
significant either at the 5 or 1 percent significance levels.     
Table 2 shows that the quarterly cross-correlation (  ) of institutional demand for 
both markets is positive, highly significant and much greater in size compared to 
Sias’ (2004) estimate; whereas Sias in the US context reports an estimate of 0.119 
for     we report higher values for Bulgaria (0.237 for ≥ 1 fund and 0.252 for ≥ 2 
funds) and, in particular, for Montenegro (0.743 for ≥ 1 fund and 0.767 for ≥ 2 funds) 
which suggest the presence of strong temporal dependence in funds’ trades in our 
sample markets4. Thus, whereas the quarter-on-quarter cross-correlation of 
institutional demand is around 12 percent in the US in Sias’ sample, the 
corresponding figures we report for Bulgaria (24-25 percent) and Montenegro (74-77 
percent) are considerably higher, suggesting that funds’ trades are, on average, far 
more correlated over time in frontier markets than in developed ones. The temporal 
dependence of Bulgarian funds’ equity-demand is herding-driven, as the “funds 
following other funds’ trades” part is significantly positive (0.289 for ≥ 1 fund and 
0.295 for ≥ 2 funds); conversely, their habit investing seems to bear no effect over it, 
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with the “funds following their own trades” part appearing insignificantly negative (-
0.052 for ≥ 1 fund and -0.043 for ≥ 2 funds). The temporal dependence of 
Montenegrin funds’ demand appears to be motivated equally strongly both by 
herding (the “funds following other funds’ trades” part equals 0.362 for ≥ 1 fund and 
0.403 for ≥ 2 funds and is statistically significant in both cases) and habit investing 
(the “funds following their own trades” part equals 0.381 for ≥ 1 fund and 0.364 for ≥ 
2 funds, and is statistically significant in both cases). 
Having established that institutional herding is significant in our two frontier markets, 
the next step is to examine whether it is driven by intent or not by assessing its 
interactions with different market states in line with what we mentioned in the 
previous section. We first partition    and its two components into two parts, 
contingent upon whether the market’s quarterly performance has been positive or 
negative (i.e. whether the market in quarter t has gone up or down relative to quarter 
t-1) and report the results in table 3. As the table indicates,    appears positive in 
Bulgaria and Montenegro in all tests, with its values in absolute terms being larger 
during negative as opposed to positive market quarters in all cases. However, its 
significance in Bulgaria appears during quarters with positive market performance, 
while disappearing during negative market quarters; conversely, its significance in 
Montenegro manifests itself irrespective of the market’s performance. Overall, the 
coefficients reported in table 3 are largely in line with those reported in table 2, 
suggesting that the quarter-on-quarter cross-correlation of institutional demand in our 
sample frontier markets is substantially higher (18 percent and above) compared to 
the US one reported in Sias (2004), even when conditioning upon market 
performance. The insignificance of the “funds following their own trades” part 
documented in table 2 for Bulgaria is confirmed here, with its estimates appearing 
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insignificant during both up and down quarters. On the other hand, that part appears 
significant for Montenegro irrespective of the market’s performance. The part “funds 
following other funds’ trades” appears significant for Bulgaria and Montenegro only 
during periods of positive market returns5, denoting an impact of market returns over 
institutional herding and suggesting that the latter is not spurious but rather driven by 
intent. A possible explanation here is that this is due to “bad” managers tracking the 
trades of their better-informed peers during market rallies in order to avoid making 
poor investments - and the concomitant personalized stigma conferred by 
underperforming during up markets. What is more, given the evidence (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001; Lamont and Thaler, 2003) suggesting that bullish markets tend to 
attract more noise investors, it is possible that the institutional herding documented 
here during up markets is the result of a concerted effort on behalf of fund managers 
to exploit noise traders during periods of optimistic sentiment.      
We now examine whether institutional herding in our sample markets interacts with 
market volatility; to that end, we rank the quarterly values of market volatility in 
ascending order, split them into two halves (“high volatility”; “low volatility”) and 
partition    and its two components accordingly. Results from table 4 indicate that     
is significantly positive for both markets in all cases, without its difference between 
periods of high and periods of low volatility exhibiting any statistical significance. 
Compared to Sias (2004) estimates, the    –values reported here (16 percent and 
above) are in excess of those reported for funds in the US. Again here, the “funds 
following their own trades” part appears insignificant (significant) for Bulgaria 
(Montenegro) for both volatility halves, thus confirming our earlier findings in tables 2 
and 3 on this part for the two markets. Herding appears insignificant in Bulgaria 
during periods of both high and low volatility as the estimates of the “funds following 
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others’ funds trades” indicate; conversely, the estimate of that part appears 
significant during periods of low volatility for Montenegro6, suggesting the presence 
of intent in fund managers’ herding there, possibly due to the fact that tranquil market 
conditions render it easier for less informed managers to monitor the trades of their 
better informed peers.  
We now turn to assess whether market volume impacts upon institutional herding; 
similarly to controlling for the impact of volatility previously, we rank the quarterly 
values of market volume in ascending order, split them into two halves (“high 
volume”; “low volume”) and partition    and its two components accordingly. Results 
in table 5 show that    is positive and significant for both markets in all cases; its 
difference between periods of high and periods of low volume exhibits no statistical 
significance. The values of    hover above 24 percent in our tests, again confirming 
that institutional demand in these two markets bears a stronger persistence quarter-
on-quarter compared to the US. The “funds following their own trades” part remains 
insignificant in Bulgaria regardless of the volume levels; conversely, this part is 
significant for Montenegro for both high and low volume periods. The “funds 
following other funds’ trades” part is significant for both markets during high volume 
periods7, thus suggesting that fund managers’ herding is motivated by intent. The 
source of this intent could be attributed to informational reasons, since high volume 
reduces frictions in trading (e.g. thin trading) and encourages the participation of 
informed investors (“good” fund managers constitute prime candidates for this role), 
thus increasing their visibility in the market – and  allowing less informed fund 
managers to track their trades more easily.  
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We conclude our empirical investigation by assessing the impact of the ongoing 
global credit crisis over institutional herding. Table 6 presents the estimates of    and 
its two components for the pre-crisis (January 2005 – December 2007) and crisis 
(March 2008 – December 2012) sub-periods. As the table shows,    is significantly 
positive for our markets both before and after the crisis’ outbreak, without its 
difference between the two sub-periods being significant. The “funds following their 
own trades” part is significant for both sub-periods for Montenegro, with the 
difference being significant at the 5 percent level; the significance of that part for 
Bulgaria appears only following the crisis’ outbreak, without however its difference 
between the two sub-periods exhibiting any statistical significance. As regards the 
“funds following other funds’ trades” part, it appears significant before the crisis’ 
outbreak for Montenegro and after the crisis’ outbreak for Bulgaria; the difference of 
the “funds following other funds’ trades” estimates before and after the crisis’ 
outbreak is insignificant for both markets. The fact that institutional herding is 
significant in Montenegro (Bulgaria) before (after) the outbreak of the crisis is an 
interesting finding and a possible explanation for it can be traced in what we 
discussed earlier (see table 1, panel G) regarding trading activity being the heaviest 
in Montenegro (Bulgaria) prior to (following) the crisis’ outbreak. In line with our 
previous discussion of the results from table 5, this demonstrates again here that 
high volume promotes herding among fund managers in these two markets. The role 
of volume in herding is important for frontier markets, as they are characterized by 
relatively low overall trading activity compared to their more developed counterparts. 
If volume is high, it is more likely that “good” fund managers in a frontier market will 
be able to trade on their information and “bad” fund managers will be able to follow 
them (both because their “good” peers will be more visible and because high volume 
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reduces trading frictions), thus suggesting that herding in relatively illiquid 
environments is facilitated during periods of increased trading activity.      
 
5. Conclusion   
This paper examines herding among fund managers in two frontier markets 
(Bulgaria; Montenegro) and whether it is intentional or spurious in nature. Despite 
the wealth of evidence on institutional herding from several long-established 
(developed and emerging) markets, research on this issue has never been 
undertaken in frontier markets to date. This is rather surprising, considering the fact 
that frontier markets bear several features (high concentration; low trading volumes; 
relatively inexperienced professional investors; incomplete institutional design; low 
transparency) capable of motivating herding among their fund managers. Drawing on 
two unique databases of quarterly fund-holdings from Bulgaria and Montenegro 
respectively, we find that fund managers herd significantly in both markets, with their 
herding being of higher magnitude compared to that reported in earlier studies on 
developed markets.  
To assess whether fund managers in Bulgaria and Montenegro herd intentionally or 
not, we examine the interactions of their herding with variables reflective of the state 
of the market, namely market returns, market volatility and market volume by testing 
for herding during quarters of positive/negative market performance, high/low 
volatility and high/low trading volume. Our results suggest that fund managers herd 
in both markets during quarters of positive market performance and high volume, 
while in the case of Montenegro their herding also appears significant during low 
volatility quarters. Our findings are consistent with fund managers herding 
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intentionally, in anticipation of informational and/or professional payoffs. More 
specifically, herding during up-markets can be attributed to “bad” managers tracking 
the trades of their “good” peers in order to avoid underperforming during positive 
market periods (given the career implications this will entail); it can also be due to 
fund managers collectively trying to exploit noise investors during euphoric times, 
when the presence of noise traders would be expected to be more pronounced. 
Herding during high volume periods can be the result of high volume reducing 
frictions in trading and encouraging “good” fund managers to trade on their 
information, thus facilitating their monitoring on behalf of their less informed peers. 
Controlling for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, we find that Bulgarian 
(Montenegrin) fund managers herd significantly after (before) its outbreak and we 
showed that this is related to these markets’ trading activity, since volume in Bulgaria 
(Montenegro) was heavier after (before) the crisis’ outbreak. Overall, trading volume 
appears to exert considerable influence over institutional herding in both markets 
and this needs to be viewed within the specific context of frontier markets, whose 
trading activity is relatively low. In such environments, an increase in liquidity allows 
“good” fund managers the opportunity to trade on their information, thus increasing 
their visibility and rendering it easier for less skilled/informed fund managers to 
observe and track their trades, more so given that liquidity reduces trading frictions.  
Our results are particularly appealing to professional investors whose interest in 
frontier markets has grown over the recent years as a result of evidence indicating 
that investing in frontier equities bears beneficial effects over international portfolio 
diversification. Given that less information is generally available regarding frontier 
markets, an investor trading in a frontier market would be naturally interested in its 
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domestic funds’ herding during different market states, as he could potentially use it 
as input for his strategy.    
What is more, our results carry important implications for the regulatory authorities in 
frontier capital markets, since intentional herding among fund managers suggests 
lack of skills (be it in the acquisition or processing of information) and this can raise 
two issues. On the one hand, herding leads fund managers to choose portfolio 
allocations that may be sub-optimal, thus not acting in the interests of their clientele; 
on the other hand, the leverage commanded by funds and the relatively low turnover 
of frontier markets can lead their herding to cause price-pressure and potential 
destabilization. It is important that regulators in these markets realize the above risks 
and take measures aiming at encouraging diversity in the investment conduct of 
funds. A possibility (Gavriilidis et al., 2013) would be for regulators to issue periodical 
statements with the level of correlation in funds’ holdings/trades alongside each 
fund’s expense-fees in order for the public to be aware of the extent to which funds 
herd, before deciding to place their money with any of them.    
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Notes 
1. Berger et al. (2011) and De Groot et al. (2012) present detailed information on the 
launch of a series of mutual funds and exchange-traded funds benchmarked 
against frontier markets, providing easier access to frontier markets’ investments. 
2. An example of the impact of financial regulation over the propensity of fund 
managers to trade similar stocks is illustrated by a series of studies on pension 
funds in Chile (Olivares, 2008) and Poland (Voronkova and Bohl, 2005); in both 
markets, pension fund managers are subject to a) limitations in the opportunity set 
of stocks they can invest into and b) the obligation to satisfy a pre-defined 
minimum-performance requirement based on relative performance evaluation. As 
both studies show, pension fund managers herd significantly in both markets, with 
the portfolios of pension funds in each market being very similar, as they are tilted 
heavily towards the constituents of each market’s top-capitalization index. 
3. According to the 2010 Meketa Investment Group white paper on frontier markets 
“A frontier market manager may need up to two weeks to build a position in a 
security, and, conversely, may need even more time to exit – even under normal 
market conditions” (p. 5).  
4. Sias (2004) reports estimates for    and its component parts for stocks traded by 
numbers of funds exceeding certain thresholds (for stocks traded by at least 5, 10 
and 20 funds). We do not employ such thresholds here given the very small (see 
table 1) number of active funds per stock. The 0.119-value mentioned here 
pertains to Sias’ full-sample test (i.e. from stocks traded by at least one fund). 
5. The difference in the    estimates and its constituent parts (“funds following their 
own trades”; “funds following other funds’ trades”) between periods of positive and 
periods of negative market returns is insignificant for both markets. 
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6. The difference in the    estimates and its constituent parts (“funds following their 
own trades”; “funds following other funds’ trades”) between periods of high and 
periods of low market volatility is insignificant for both markets. 
7. The difference in the    estimates and its constituent parts (“funds following their 
own trades”; “funds following other funds’ trades”) between periods of high and 
periods of low market volume is insignificant for Bulgaria. The difference in the    
estimates and its “funds following their own trades” part’s estimates between 
periods of high and periods of low market volume is insignificant for Montenegro 
as well; however, the difference of the “funds following other funds’ trades” 
estimates between high and low volume periods is significant at the 5 percent 
level for Montenegro.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
        
        
Panel A: Sample data 
   
Number of stocks Number of funds Number of quarter-holding positions Number of stock-quarters 
Bulgaria 143 Bulgaria 25 Bulgaria 9912 Bulgaria 1880 
Montenegro 82 Montenegro 6 Montenegro 5255 Montenegro 1615 
Panel B: Average number of stocks per quarter held by at least one fund 
      
  
Jan 2005-Dec 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bulgaria  
86.2 49.5 73.3 88.5 95.8 94.0 94.7 95.3 98.2 
Montenegro  
58.9 50.5 57.3 58.5 60.8 60.8 60.9 61.0 61,1 
Panel C: Average number of stocks per quarter actively traded by at least one fund 
      
  
Jan 2005-Dec 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bulgaria  
59.7 24.0 47.8 68.8 72.0 64.7 64.8 66.2 69.3 
Montenegro  
25.8 23.0 26.3 38.0 30.0 21.0 21.0 22.3 24,9 
Panel D: Average number of holding funds per stock per quarter 
      
  
Jan 2005-Dec 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bulgaria  
3.8 1.7 2.1 3.5 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 
Montenegro  
2.3 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 
Panel E: Average number of actively trading funds per stock per quarter 
      
  
Jan 2005-Dec 2012 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bulgaria  
3.0 1.6 2.0 3.0 3.9 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Montenegro  
1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Panel F: Full sample period statistics on market returns/volatility/volume 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Quartiles of Distribution 
P_25 P_50 P_75 P_100 
BG40 returns -0.0019 -0.0036 0.2219 -0.0978 -0.0036 0.1301 0.5576 
BG40 volume  78255035.24 50517852.20 75302475.16 42554157 50517852 92328230 331548377 
BG40 volatility 0.0960 0.0739 0.0543 0.0610 0.0739 0.1280 0.3008 
NEX20 returns 0.0459 0.0220 0.2697 -0.1240 0.0220 0.2273 0.7866 
NEX20 volume 62743058.44 32623533.52 68735684.98 
4994210 7526724 11340384 14272456 
NEX20 volatility 0.1263 0.1156 0.0598 0.0789 0.1156 0.1612 0.2967 
Panel G: Year-by-year statistics on market returns/volatility/volume 
    Quartiles of Distribution 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
P_25 P_50 P_75 P_100 
2005    
    
BG40 Returns 0.0355 -0.0131 0.2007 -0.1364 -0.0131 0.2555 0.2560 
BG40 Volume 20088356.25 14565305.00 15628556.42 10082345 14565305 30094368 42867555 
BG40 Volatility 0.0907 0.0868 0.0356 0.0631 0.0868 0.1183 0.1354 
NEX 20 Returns 0.3236 0.3211 0.1402 0.2022 0.3211 0.4449 0.4499 
NEX 20 volume 49344186.82 48651043.50 19130241.03 34376901 48651044 64311472 72073881 
NEX 20 volatility 0.1563 0.1351 0.0495 0.1276 0.1351 0.1850 0.2299 
2006    
    
BG40 Returns 0.0636 0.0840 0.0747 0.0197 0.0840 0.1075 0.1301 
BG40 Volume 51168166.00 43458010.00 29619234.21 33271005 43458010 69065328 93455393 
BG40 Volatility 0.0494 0.0475 0.0101 0.0424 0.0475 0.0564 0.0631 
NEX 20 Returns 0.2443 0.2576 0.1555 0.1469 0.2576 0.3416 0.4204 
NEX 20 volume 94254544.01 75439795.35 74034723.74 37839724 75439795 150669364 193447179 
NEX 20 volatility 0.0872 0.0859 0.0208 0.0724 0.0859 0.1021 0.1135 
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Panel G: Year-by-year statistics on market returns/volatility/volume (continued) 
 
   Quartiles of Distribution 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
P_25 P_50 P_75 P_100 
2007    
    
BG40 Returns 0.2755 0.2192 0.1962 0.1522 0.2192 0.3988 0.5576 
BG40 Volume 120163647 58275233.00 132939841 47448022 58275233 192879272 319087303 
BG40 Volatility 0.1258 0.1328 0.0382 0.0970 0.1328 0.1547 0.1624 
NEX 20 Returns 0.1793 0.0161 0.4087 -0.0452 0.0161 0.4038 0.7866 
NEX 20 volume 182371866 174771405 68570104.27 124957580 174771405 239786153 260510145 
NEX 20 volatility 0.1632 0.1673 0.0273 0.1416 0.1673 0.1847 0.1893 
2008    
    
BG40 Returns -0.2506 -0.2738 0.1864 -0.4082 -0.2738 -0.0930 -0.0436 
BG40 Volume 111259569 42792203.50 147033839 34466538 42792204 188052599 331548377 
BG40 Volatility 0.1915 0.1677 0.0763 0.1402 0.1677 0.2429 0.3008 
NEX 20 Returns -0.2455 -0.2503 0.0997 -0.3304 -0.2503 -0.1606 -0.1407 
NEX 20 volume 39314393.46 38725795.90 14703558.97 27780531 38725796 50848256 56800580 
NEX 20 volatility 0.1977 0.1934 0.0814 0.1352 0.1934 0.2602 0.2967 
2009    
    
BG40 Returns -0.1036 -0.0346 0.3933 -0.4100 -0.0346 0.2028 0.2657 
BG40 Volume 97115763.88 78868664.46 52135342.59 61843060 78868664 132388467 172116959 
BG40 Volatility 0.1153 0.1187 0.0297 0.0940 0.1187 0.1367 0.1473 
NEX 20 Returns 0.0484 0.0785 0.3956 -0.2673 0.0785 0.3641 0.4635 
NEX 20 volume 100358221 102881773 66751010.75 44556718 102881773 156159724 168522307 
NEX 20 volatility 0.1631 0.1744 0.0471 0.1288 0.1744 0.1973 0.2050 
2010    
    
BG40 Returns -0.0332 -0.0465 0.0853 -0.1014 -0.0465 0.0349 0.0734 
BG40 Volume 48457635.74 47263890.33 6406524.22 43211227 47263890 53704045 56251610 
BG40 Volatility 0.0597 0.0600 0.0036 0.0568 0.0600 0.0626 0.0635 
NEX 20 Returns -0.0721 -0.0544 0.1425 -0.1887 -0.0544 0.0445 0.0631 
NEX 20 volume 13390549.79 13315904.29 3893056.66 10477188 13315904 16303912 18073747 
NEX 20 volatility 0.0664 0.0648 0.0140 0.0551 0.0648 0.0777 0.0832 
2011    
    
BG40 Returns 0.0003 -0.0250 0.1079 -0.0771 -0.0250 0.0776 0.1489 
BG40 Volume 79489297.93 88452276.13 22462795.72 65608739 88452276 93369857 94674692 
BG40 Volatility 0.0690 0.0725 0.0168 0.0566 0.0725 0.0813 0.0847 
NEX 20 Returns -0.0538 -0.0712 0.0720 -0.1099 -0.0712 0.0024 0.0406 
NEX 20 volume 14743409.03 15310150.78 3132271.93 12424842 15310151 17061977 17784186 
NEX 20 volatility 0.1063 0.1045 0.0316 0.0816 0.1045 0.1310 0.1443 
2012    
    
BG40 Returns 0.0066 0.0071 0.0753 -0.0478 0.0071 0.0611 0.0965 
BG40 Volume 98297846.85 87402405.52 58635962.53 60728636 87402406 135867058 179142676 
BG40 Volatility 0.0668 0.0673 0.0054 0.0626 0.0673 0.0711 0.0726 
NEX 20 Returns -0.0566 -0.0343 0.1033 -0.1394 -0.0343 0.0262 0.0294 
NEX 20 volume 8167297.00 7526724.05 4579633.68 4994210 7526724 11340384 14272456 
NEX 20 volatility 0.0702 0.0716 0.0109 0.0614 0.0716 0.0789 0.0805 
Sample data include quarterly holdings of funds from Bulgaria and Montenegro for the January 2005 - December 2012 
period. For each quarter we calculate the number of stocks held/traded by at least one fund; for each quarter we also 
calculate the number of funds holding/active in each stock for stocks traded by at least one fund. Panels B-E provide the 
time series’ averages of these figures for each year as well as their total average throughout the sample period. Panel F 
presents descriptive statistics (mean; median; standard deviation; distribution quartiles) on the market variables (market 
returns; market volatility; market volume) used in this study to identify herding intent for the full sample period (January 
2005 – December 2012) while panel G presents descriptive statistics on these variables for each year separately. The 
returns/volatility/volume for Bulgaria correspond to those of the market’s main index (BG40), while those of Montenegro to 
those of the NEX20 index. The returns for the full sample period and each year separately have been calculated as first 
logarithmic differences; the volatility for the full sample period and each year separately has been calculated based on 
Schwert (1989). Volume figures for both markets refer to number of shares in thousands. All data have been obtained from 
the respective stock exchanges (Bulgarian Stock Exchange and Montenegro Stock Exchange). 
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Table 2: Tests for herding – Buyer if increased position  
                 Partitioned slope coefficient 
Market Average coefficient (β) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following others’ trades Average R² 
Panel A: No of active funds per stock ≥ 1 
Bulgaria 
0.237 
(0.0012) 
-0.052 
(0.5720) 
0.289 
(0.0081) 
0.0647 
Montenegro  0.743 
(0.0003) 
0.381 
(0.0001) 
0.362 
(0.0026) 
0.4810 
Panel B: No of active funds per stock ≥ 2 
Bulgaria 
0.252 
(0.0026) 
-0.043 
(0.6835) 
0.295 
(0.0102) 
0.0689 
Montenegro 0.767 
(0.0017) 
0.364 
(0.0026) 
0.403 
(0.0019) 
0.5002 
This table reports the results from equation (4), namely                    . For each security and quarter 
between January 2005 and December 2012 we calculate the fraction of funds that increase their position in the 
security in the Bulgarian and Montenegrin markets. A fund is defined as increasing its position if it holds a greater 
fraction of the firm’s shares at the end of the quarter than it held at the beginning. All data are standardized (i.e. 
rescaled to zero mean, unit variance) each quarter. We then estimate quarterly cross-sectional regressions of 
institutional demand on lagged institutional demand. Because there is a single independent variable in each 
regression and the data are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross-sectional correlations 
between institutional demand and lagged institutional demand. The first column reports the time-series’ average 
of these 31 correlation coefficients and associated p-values (in parentheses). The second and third columns 
report the portion of the correlation that results from funds following their own lagged trades and the portion that 
results from funds following the previous trades of other funds (herding).  
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Table 3: Tests for herding conditional upon market returns 
Market  Average coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their 
own trades  
Funds following 
others’ trades  
Average R² 
Positive 
market 
returns 
Negative 
market 
returns 
Positive 
market 
returns 
Negative 
market 
returns 
Positive 
market 
returns 
Negative 
market 
returns 
Positive 
market 
returns 
Negative 
market 
returns 
Panel A: No of active funds per stock ≥ 1 
Bulgaria 
0.1818 
(0.0025) 
0.2270 
(0.0901) 
-0.1526 
(0.3609) 
0.0658 
(0.2467) 
0.3344 
(0.0489) 
0.1612 
(0.0731) 
 
0.0464 
 
0.0941 
 
 
Montenegro 
0.6905 
(0.0012) 
0.8565 
(0.0009) 
0.2902 
(0.0166) 
0.4893 
(0.0121) 
0.4003 
(0.0043) 
0.3672 
(0.1725) 
0.5012 0.5088 
Test for equality of 
the mean 
(Bulgaria) 
-0.0886 
 
-1.2391 
 
0.9906 
 
 
Test for equality of 
the mean 
(Montenegro) 
-0.9573 
 
-1.2852 
 
0.1968 
 
 
Panel B: No of active funds per stock ≥ 2 
 
Bulgaria 
 
0.1921 
(0.0031) 
 
0.2426 
(0.0857) 
 
-0.1498 
(0.4512) 
 
0.0569 
(0.2311) 
 
0.3419 
(0.0424) 
 
0.1857 
(0.0598) 
 
0.0472 
 
0.0985 
 
 
Montenegro 
 
0.7331 
(0.0022) 
 
0.8726 
(0.0001) 
 
0.3003 
(0.0301) 
 
0.5025 
(0.0101) 
 
0.4328 
(0.0039) 
 
0.3701 
(0.1536) 
 
0.5233 
 
0.5144 
Test for equality of 
the mean 
(Bulgaria) 
-0.0911 
 
-1.2206 
 
0.9721 
 
 
Test for equality of 
the mean 
(Montenegro) 
-1.1121 
 
-1.2633 
 
0.2257 
 
 
For each security and quarter between January 2005 and December 2012 we calculate the fraction of funds 
increasing their position in the security in the Bulgarian and Montenegrin markets. A fund increases its position if 
it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s shares at the end of the quarter that it held at the beginning. All data are 
standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero mean, unit variance) each quarter. We then estimate quarterly cross-sectional 
regressions of institutional demand on lagged institutional demand. Because there is a single independent 
variable in each regression and the data are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross-
sectional correlations between institutional demand and lagged institutional demand. We then average our results 
across two distinctive groups, contingent upon whether the quarterly market return is positive or negative. The 
BG40 and NEX20 indices are used here to calculate market returns for Bulgaria and Montenegro, respectively. 
Panels A and B report the estimates from these regressions when taking into account securities traded by at 
least one and two funds, respectively. The first column reports the time-series’ average of these correlation 
coefficients and associated p-values (in parentheses) for each of the two groups. The second and third columns 
report the portion of the correlation that results from funds following their own lagged trades and the portion that 
results from funds following the previous trades of other funds (herding), respectively. For each of the three 
estimated parts (β; funds following their own trades; funds following others’ trades) we perform tests of the 
difference of their means between positive and negative market quarters whose t-statistics are included in each 
panel; with respect to these tests, * indicates significance at the 5 percent level and ** indicates significance at 
the 1 percent level.   
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Table 4: Tests for herding conditional upon market volatility 
Market  Average coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their 
own trades  
Funds following 
others’ trades  
Average R² 
High 
volatility 
Low 
volatility 
High 
volatility 
Low 
volatility 
High 
volatility 
Low 
volatility 
High 
volatility 
Low 
volatility 
Panel A: No of active funds per stock ≥ 1 
Bulgaria 
0.1647 
(0.0039) 
0.2591 
(0.0469) 
-0.1032 
(0.4322) 
-0.0322 
(0.7632) 
0.2679 
(0.0698) 
0.2913 
(0.0744) 
0.0332 0.0429 
Montenegro 0.7747 
(0.0009) 
0.7609 
(0.0011) 
0.4914 
(0.0013) 
0.2903 
(0.0431) 
0.2833 
(0.1438) 
0.4706 
(0.0039) 
0.4965 0.5228 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Bulgaria) 
 
-0.3710 
 
 
-0.4792 
 
 
-0.2113 
 
 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Montenegro) 
 
0.1964 
 
0.6958 
 
-0.5898 
 
Panel B: No of active funds per stock ≥ 2 
Bulgaria 
0.1704 
(0.0045) 
0.2602 
(0.0397) 
-0.0987 
(0.4809) 
-0.0375 
(0.7883) 
0.2691 
(0.0604) 
0.2977 
(0.0752) 
0.0340 0.0436 
Montenegro 
0.7903 
(0.0028) 
0.7738 
(0.0098) 
0.5047 
(0.0007) 
0.2909 
(0.0397) 
0.2856 
(0.1622) 
0.4829 
(0.0027) 
0.4979 0.5240 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Bulgaria) 
 
-0.3588 
 
 
-0.4418 
 
 
-0.2165 
 
 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Montenegro) 
 
0.2155 
 
0.6800 
 
-0.5963 
 
For each security and quarter between January 2005 and December 2012 we calculate the fraction of funds 
increasing their position in the security. A fund increases its position if it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s 
shares at the end of the quarter that it held at the beginning. All data are standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero 
mean, unit variance) each quarter. We then estimate quarterly cross-sectional regressions of institutional demand 
on lagged institutional demand. Because there is a single independent variable in each regression and the data 
are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross-sectional correlations between institutional 
demand and lagged institutional demand. We then average our results across two distinctive groups, namely 
“high volatility” and “low volatility” contingent upon whether the market’s volatility during the contemporaneous 
quarter falls in the top or bottom half of the sample period’s quarterly volatility estimates ranked in ascending 
order. Volatility here is calculated every quarter using the standard deviation of daily returns in line with Schwert 
(1989) on the basis of BG40 and NEX20 index returns for Bulgaria and Montenegro, respectively. Panels A and 
B report the estimates from these regressions when taking into account securities traded by at least one and two 
funds, respectively. The first column reports the time-series’ average of these correlation coefficients and 
associated p-values (in parentheses) for each of the two groups. The second and third columns report the portion 
of the correlation that results from funds following their own lagged trades and the portion that results from funds 
following the previous trades of other funds (herding). For each of the three estimated parts (β; funds following 
their own trades; funds following others’ trades) we perform tests of the difference of their means between high 
and low market volatility quarters whose t-statistics are included in each panel; with respect to these tests, * 
indicates significance at the 5 percent level and ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5: Tests for herding conditional upon market volume 
Market  Average coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their 
own trades  
Funds following 
others’ trades  
Average R² 
High 
volume 
Low 
volume 
High 
volume 
Low 
volume 
High 
volume 
Low 
volume 
High 
volume 
Low 
volume 
Panel A: No of active funds per stock ≥ 1 
Bulgaria 
0.2531 
(0.0071) 
0.2466 
(0.0386) 
-0.1211 
(0.3122) 
0.0813 
(0.0614) 
0.3742 
(0.0382) 
0.1653 
(0.0892) 
0.0541 0.0769 
Montenegro 0.8204 
(0.0013) 
0.6292 
(0.0007) 
0.2012 
(0.0068) 
0.4335 
(0.0019) 
0.6192 
(0.0067) 
0.1957 
(0.1681) 
0.4803 0.5352 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Bulgaria) 
 
-0.0581 
 
-1.6049 
 
1.3575 
 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Montenegro) 
 
0.9545 
 
-2.0366 
 
2.1667* 
 
Panel B: No of active funds per stock ≥ 2 
Bulgaria 
0.2744 
(0.0068) 
0.2531 
(0.0422) 
-0.1059 
(0.3059) 
0.0809 
(0.0688) 
0.3803 
(0.0308) 
0.1722 
(0.0796) 
0.0547 0.0773 
Montenegro 0.8404 
(0.0011) 
0.6379 
(0.0007) 
0.2200 
(0.0052) 
0.4377 
(0.0019) 
0.6394 
(0.0071) 
0.2002 
(0.1681) 
0.4899 0.5364 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Bulgaria) 
 
-0.0601 
 
-1.5211 
 
1.3672 
 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Montenegro) 
 
0.9911 
 
-2.0106 
 
2.2252* 
 
For each security and quarter between January 2005 and December 2012 we calculate the fraction of funds 
increasing their position in the security. A fund increases its position if it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s 
shares at the end of the quarter that it held at the beginning. All data are standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero 
mean, unit variance) each quarter. We then estimate quarterly cross-sectional regressions of institutional demand 
on lagged institutional demand. Because there is a single independent variable in each regression and the data 
are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross-sectional correlations between institutional 
demand and lagged institutional demand. We then average our results across two distinctive groups, namely 
“high volume” and “low volume” contingent upon whether the market’s volume during the contemporaneous 
quarter falls in the top or bottom half of the sample period’s quarterly volume values ranked in ascending order. 
Volume here is calculated every quarter by aggregating the daily volume observations of the BG40 and NEX20 
indices for Bulgaria and Montenegro, respectively, each quarter. Panels A and B report the estimates from these 
regressions when taking into account securities traded by at least one and two funds, respectively. The first 
column reports the time-series’ average of these correlation coefficients and associated p-values (in 
parentheses) for each of the two groups. The second and third columns report the portion of the correlation that 
results from funds following their own lagged trades and the portion that results from funds following the previous 
trades of other funds (herding). For each of the three estimated parts (β; funds following their own trades; funds 
following others’ trades) we perform tests of the difference of their means between high and low market volume 
quarters whose t-statistics are included in each panel; with respect to these tests, * indicates significance at the 5 
percent level and ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 6: Tests for herding pre versus post crisis-outbreak 
Market  Average coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their 
own trades  
Funds following 
others’ trades  
Average R² 
Pre-crisis 
outbreak 
Post-
crisis 
outbreak 
Pre-crisis 
outbreak 
Post-
crisis 
outbreak 
Pre-crisis 
outbreak 
Post-
crisis 
outbreak 
Pre-crisis 
outbreak 
Post-
crisis 
outbreak 
Panel A: No of active funds per stock ≥ 1  
Bulgaria 
0.2282 
(0.0409) 
0.2917 
(0.0009) 
-0.0799 
(0.5796) 
0.0571 
(0.0367) 
0.3081 
(0.0781) 
0.2346 
(0.0039) 
0.0903 0.0725 
Montenegro 0.7124 
(0.0006) 
0.8128 
(0.0045) 
0.2322 
(0.0003) 
0.5531 
(0.0042) 
0.4802 
(0.0008) 
0.2597 
(0.4177) 
0.4736 0.5789 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Bulgaria) 
 
-0.3494 
 
-1.1370 
 
0.7527 
 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Montenegro) 
 
-0.7058 
 
-2.7357* 
 
1.0251 
 
Panel B: No of active funds per stock ≥ 2 
Bulgaria 
0.2569 
(0.0394) 
0.3066 
(0.0017) 
-0.0655 
(0.5537) 
0.0599 
(0.0302) 
0.3224 
(0.0667) 
0.2467 
(0.0011) 
0.1009 0.0811 
Montenegro 0.7308 
(0.0002) 
0.8431 
(0.0039) 
0.2385 
(0.0001) 
0.5742 
(0.0047) 
0.4923 
(0.0005) 
0.2689 
(0.4384) 
0.4835 0.5844 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Bulgaria) 
 
-0.3200 
 
-1.1112 
 
0.7701 
 
Test for 
equality of 
the mean 
(Montenegro) 
 
-0.7192 
 
-2.8562* 
 
1.0523 
 
For each security and quarter between January 2005 and December 2012 we calculate the fraction of funds 
increasing their position in the security. A fund increases its position if it holds a greater fraction of the firm’s 
shares at the end of the quarter that it held at the beginning. All data are standardized (i.e. rescaled to zero 
mean, unit variance) each quarter. We then estimate quarterly cross-sectional regressions of institutional demand 
on lagged institutional demand. Because there is a single independent variable in each regression and the data 
are standardized, these regression coefficients are also the cross-sectional correlations between institutional 
demand and lagged institutional demand. We then average our results across two distinctive sub-periods, the 
one before the crisis-outbreak (January 2005 – December 2007) and the one after the crisis-outbreak (March 
2008 - December 2012). Panels A and B report the estimates from these regressions when taking into account 
securities traded by at least one and two funds, respectively. The first column reports the time-series’ average of 
these correlation coefficients and associated p-values (in parentheses) for each of the two sub-periods. The 
second and third columns report the portion of the correlation that results from funds following their own lagged 
trades and the portion that results from funds following the previous trades of other funds (herding). For each of 
the three estimated parts (β; funds following their own trades; funds following others’ trades) we perform tests of 
the difference of their means before and after the crisis’ outbreak whose t-statistics are included in each panel; 
with respect to these tests, * indicates significance at the 5 percent level and ** indicates significance at the 1 
percent level. 
 
 
 
